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Abstract Dealing consistently with risk and uncertainty across the IPCC reports
is a difficult challenge. Huge practical difficulties arise from the Panel’s scale and
interdisciplinary context, the complexity of the climate change issue and its political
context. The key question of this paper is if the observed differences in the handling
of uncertainties by the three IPCC Working Groups can be clarified. To address
this question, the paper reviews a few key issues on the foundations of uncertainty
analysis, and summarizes the history of the treatment of uncertainty by the IPCC.
One of the key findings is that there is reason to agree to disagree: the fundamen-
tal differences between the issues covered by the IPCC’s three interdisciplinary
Working Groups, between the type of information available, and between the
dominant paradigms of the practitioners, legitimately lead to different approaches.
We argue that properly using the IPCC’s Guidance Notes for Lead Authors for
addressing uncertainty, adding a pedigree analysis for key findings, and particularly
communicating the diverse nature of uncertainty to the users of the assessment would
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increase the quality of the assessment. This approach would provide information
about the nature of the uncertainties in addition to their magnitude and the confi-
dence assessors have in their findings.
1 Introduction
Since its inception, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
given increasing attention to the management and reporting of uncertainties. Since
the start of the IPCC, the author teams of the different Working Groups (WGs)
have differed in terms of the level of attention paid to, and methods applied for,
assessing uncertainty. Most visibly attention has been given to the communication of
uncertainties by the natural scientists in the areas of climate science and impacts, and
to a lesser extent, or at least very differently, by social scientists in the assessment
of vulnerability, sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and adaptation and mitigation
options. For the Third and Fourth Assessment Reports (TAR and AR4), an effort
was made to enhance consistency in the treatment of uncertainties by the various
WGs by developing guidance papers prepared for all WGs at the beginning of the
writing process. This led to fairly consistent treatment of uncertainties within but not
across WGs, neither in the TAR, nor in the AR4. WG I focused on uncertainties
in climatic processes and probabilities and WG II on risks and confidence levels.
During the TAR process, these guidelines were hardly used by the authors of WG III
(primarily economists and other social scientists), who continued to address uncer-
tainties less systematically and in a different fashion. During the AR4, they adopted
a common qualitative approach. The issues covered by the social scientists have a
different nature from those covered by the natural scientists, adding uncertainties
related to human choice to the lack of scientific understanding of the systems which
determine climatic changes and associated impacts. What are the reasons for these
different approaches? Are they legitimate? What are the implications for future
assessments? These are the key questions addressed in this paper.
Processes within the scientific community and interactions with the external world
of policy makers and other stakeholders are critical for the formulation of findings
(e.g., Craye et al. 2005). Hence, frameworks other than the IPCC may lead to
different results. However, in this paper, we take the position and procedures of the
IPCC as an intermediary between science and policy as a given, and do not discuss
alternative ways of communicating scientific climate change research and associated
uncertainties, ways that may or may not be more effective. Still, within the limits of
the IPCC, even if its procedures are fixed in negotiated documents, there may be
opportunities for adapting procedures to improve uncertainty communication.
This paper is based on two qualitative methods: the authors’ observations as IPCC
participants (taken together, their experiences cover all four assessments), and IPCC
document analysis. It discusses typologies of uncertainties relevant to climate change
in general and mitigation in particular (Section 2), the history of the treatment of
uncertainties by the IPCC (Section 3), the challenges of addressing uncertainties
from diverse perspectives, taking costs and potentials of mitigation options as a case
study (Section 4), and finally it proposes how improvements can be made in future
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IPCC reports, focusing on WG III, the WG to which the first three authors of this
paper contributed during the AR4 (Section 5).
2 Typologies of uncertainties relevant to climate change
Dealing consistently with risk and uncertainty across the IPCC reports is a difficult
challenge. Huge practical difficulties arise from the Panel’s scale alone: any coordina-
tion in a very heterogeneous community is difficult, especially when there is no single
authoritative management point of view, but thousands of scientists contributing on
a voluntary basis from all parts of the world. Moreover, climate change assessments
are written in a very interdisciplinary context by climatologists, engineers, ecologists,
economists, political scientists and other experts. These difficulties of scale and inter-
disciplinarity are compounded by the complexity of the climate issue and the link
of the IPCC process to the political negotiations. These technical and philosophical
problems are not completely new. Indeed researchers of all kinds have thought about
the nature of knowledge and ignorance for centuries (Nimier 2004). Reviewing a few
key issues on the foundations of uncertainty analysis sets the context for this paper
by identifying more precisely the difficulties facing the IPCC.
2.1 Towards a common goal: to improve the assessment and communication
of uncertainties
What should be the IPCC goal in elaborating common guidelines on uncertainties
for its future reports, and how much convergence should be aimed for? In our view,
the primary goal of guidance to authors is to encourage them to acknowledge the
importance of uncertainties and describe their full range and the multiplicity of views
in a transparent fashion. In order to reach this goal, guidance should (a) establish
a vocabulary to describe levels of confidence or of probability consistent across all
WGs and from one report to the next; (b) educate the writing teams with the basic
elements of the science (or art) of uncertainty communication; (c) establish the view
that different approaches to scientific knowledge and uncertainty are legitimate, and
(d) enable the authors to help the readers of the assessment understand not only how
large uncertainties are and how confident the assessors are about their findings, but
also the nature and origin of the uncertainties.
Additionally, recommendations to the writing teams should be based on the state
of the art in the scientific understanding of risk and uncertainty communication.
They should fit well with the models of risk, uncertainty, rationality and decision
making used by the researchers. At the same time, they should be convenient to
follow by IPCC authors. They should lead to effective communication of the risk
and uncertainty aspects of the assessment to the intended audience. Such a set of
guidelines can be valuable well beyond the IPCC community, to other international
academic bodies concerned with risks and uncertainties. For example, the authors of
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (e.g., MA 2005) used – with mixed success –
the earlier experience from the IPCC Third Assessment, adapting the “likelihood”
scale of WG I and the qualitative scale from the IPCC TAR Guidance (see below). A
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similar IPCC-derived approach was used by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(ACIA 2004).
2.2 Recognizing philosophical controversies, and agreeing to disagree
Uncertainties can have different “locations” (that is, where in the assessment the
uncertainties arise, e.g., in the context, input data, model/methodology, or selection
of output variables), different “levels” (statistical uncertainty, scenario uncertainty
and recognized ignorance), a different nature (epistemic, variability), a different
qualification of the knowledge base (from weak to strong), and they involve value-
ladenness of choices (Table 1, see also Walker et al. 2003; Janssen et al. 2005;
Petersen 2006; van der Sluijs et al. 2008). First, they depend on the context of the
assessment and the ecological, technological, economic, social and political questions
that the assessment addresses: how do we define the problem, and which choices do
we make in this definition? Second, uncertainties arise at the level of observations
(measurements for natural phenomena and some socio-economic statistics, possibly
survey data for other socio-economic, political and cultural issues) and from how
the data from observations are turned into indicators used in the assessment (e.g. by
combinations of variables, statistical methods). Third, various types of uncertainties
arise when models are used, such as choices of parameters and model relationships,
soft- and hardware implementation of those relationships, and the selection of input
data. Fourth, uncertainties are introduced when outputs are processed, e.g. through
the formulation of statements and key findings, and by constructing indicators to
communicate these findings.
Expert judgment is generally used in all steps of an assessment. For example,
Kloprogge et al. (2005) conducted a workshop-supported analysis of two indicators
from the 5th Dutch Environmental Outlook, the projected change in the length of
Table 1 A typology of uncertainty, represented as an uncertainty matrix
Location of
uncertainty
↓
Level of uncertainty
(from determinism, through
probability and possibility, to
ignorance)
Nature of
uncertainty
Qualification
of
knowledge
base
Value-
ladenness
of choices
Statistical
uncertainty
Scenario
uncertainty
Recognised
ignorance
Epis-
temic
Varia-
bility
– 0 + – 0 +
Context
Expert 
judgment
M
O 
D 
E 
L 
Structure
Implemen- 
tation
Parameters
Inputs 
Data 
Outputs
Adapted from Janssen et al. (2003)
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the growing season as a result of climate change, and deaths and hospital admittances
due to ozone exposure. For the first indicator, seven discrete steps in the assessment
process were identified, involving 19 explicit or implicit assumptions. For the second
indicator, five steps and 18 assumptions were identified. These assumptions were
mapped and prioritized, their value-ladenness was analyzed, and communication
of the prioritized assumptions and their value-ladenness was discussed. This was a
major effort for only two indicators at the national level. Doing the same thing for
the much larger number of indicators reported in IPCC assessments by author teams
would be next to impossible. In some cases, authors can rely on uncertainty analyses
reported in the peer reviewed literature that forms the basis for the assessment, but
in many cases, they have to judge the uncertainties without that information.
Experts can relatively easily agree on the different locations of uncertainty in
assessments. But they are divided on how to further characterize this uncertainty.
More than a century of philosophical discussion on uncertainty has shown that
there are divisions which cannot be resolved. For the sake of simplicity, we address
three of the most fundamental differences between uncertainty approaches, namely
those between the objective and the subjective views of uncertainty, those between
precise, probabilistic risk and imprecise uncertainty, and those between uncertainties
in natural systems and human choice. We reduce the uncertainty problem to these
dimensions only to explore the key questions of this paper about the rationale and
legitimacy of the differences between the different IPCC Working Groups, and do
not exclude that other dimensions could also be considered.
The division between the objective and the subjective views of probabilities is the
oldest. Objective views of probabilities include the classical approach (probability
is the proportion of favorable cases over total cases), the frequentist approach
(probability is the limit of frequency in the long run (Von Mises 1957)), and the
propensity approach (probability is a physical tendency (Popper 1959)). These views
are objective in that probability is seen to be an intrinsic property of the system
being studied. This is opposed to the Bayesian point of view, in which probabilities
refer to degrees of belief (De Finetti 1937; Savage 1954), and which mostly reflects a
subjective perspective.
Then there is the difference between situations where information can legitimately
be represented using precise probabilities, and situations where the information
is too imprecise to use a probability distribution. Knight (1921) called this the
difference between situations of risk and situations of uncertainty, but the vocabulary
is not standardized in the literature. There is a standard definition of risk as the
combination of the probability of an event and its consequences (ISO 2002), which
is consistent with, but more general than, the simple “product of probability times
loss.” As for uncertainty, it may be simpler to define it negatively, that is all other
forms of ignorance about a system for which we don’t have well founded precise
probabilities.1 This does not mean that all kinds uncertainty are out of reach of
1Risk and uncertainty in some definitions do not capture the full range of what we do not know.
Wynne (1992) distinguishes in addition to risk (known odds) and uncertainty (unknown odds but
parameters largely known) also ignorance (where we ‘don’t know what we don’t know’) and –
spanning uncertainty and ignorance – indeterminacy (where causal chains or networks are open).
The later two aspects are either implicitly or explicitly (e.g. when describing surprises) included in
IPCC assessments and captured in the broad definition of uncertainty that we adopt in this paper.
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rigorous formal analysis, see for example the imprecise probabilities approaches in
Walley (1991) or Ellsberg (2001).
The third dimension is the difference between uncertainty in causal systems and
uncertainty in intentional systems. In the former, the past determines the future.
In the latter, the arrow of time can be reversed: long term goals can influence the
present. Causality is recognized as a fundamental principle of all natural sciences, and
accordingly most models of natural systems are resolved with recursive simulation,
computing the state at t + 1 from the state at date t. This is generally not the case
with models of systems involving human choices, which are intentional. Even though
causal descriptions are often used in analyzing social systems (see, e.g., demographic
models), the social scientist is often confronted with the intentionality of his/her
objects of study – which adds a fundamentally different layer of deep uncertainty
to studies of the long-term future of societal systems. The presence of intentionality
also makes that in large parts of social science, Laplace’s principle of indifference
(all outcomes are equally probable) is replaced by a principle of optimization: assume
that agents in the system will choose what they think is best rather than acting
randomly.
Both objective and subjective sources of information can be precise or imprecise.
Imprecision occurs in the frequentist setting when the sample size is small, and in
the subjective setting when experts are deeply uncertain and cannot give precise
probabilities, and hence cannot quantify risk. In climate change assessment, infor-
mation about the unknown future is important, notably because of the role of human
choice captured by the causal/intentionality dimension above. From a policy point of
view it can be important to distinguish between the uncertainties related to lack of
knowledge about the way biogeochemical and socio-economic systems function and
those related to the understanding of the role of human choice.2
Critically for an interdisciplinary panel, traditional experimental sciences methods
have predominantly relied on the objective and precise approach to information,
while social sciences methods have tended to use more subjective (e.g. most Bayesian
methods) and imprecise approaches. Experimental sciences seek to determine pre-
cise objective frequencies based on a large body of observations, and experiments
are (at least assumed) reproducible. Social sciences rarely have replicated controlled
experiments or even complete observations, and often the most adequate description
of knowledge available is narrative. This leads to imprecise theories, which are also
subjective in that they are based on actions of humans observed by other humans.
Saying that experimental sciences tend to take a ‘hard’ (precise, objective and
causal) approach of knowledge, while social sciences tend to be on the ‘soft’ (impre-
cise, subjective, intentional) side is of course only a general tendency. When there are
missing data or a small number of observations, experimental results also can be very
imprecise. In the natural science of climate, which is largely an observational science,
imprecisions reign, since some critical data are scarce and experimentation with the
2In a similar vein, Allen et al. (2004) recommend that WG I distinguish between scenario uncertainty
(different emissions paths), natural variability, and response uncertainty (incomplete knowledge of
timescales and feedback processes). Briscoe (2004), in an overview of inputs into a US hearing on
communicating scientific uncertainties, noted that the science of climate change is affected by two
main types of uncertainty: unknown aspects of how the climate system works and of how human
actions will impact climate change.
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climate system is impossible (see, e.g., Petersen 2000). Many “observation” data are
in fact the result of data reanalysis. On the other hand, there are social objects such as
financial markets, which lend themselves well to an objective (frequentist) approach.
There is an emerging array of disciplines blurring the distinction between hard and
soft sciences, such as behavioral- or experimental- or neuro-economics. Nevertheless,
some debates on uncertainty within IPCC circles (for example on the question of
future emission levels as a function of socio-economic scenarios and resulting climate
change) can be seen as discussions between the imprecise-subjective and the precise-
objective positions.
What are the challenges in dealing with the varying dominance of the objective-
subjective, the precise-imprecise, and the causal-intentional dimensions in an inter-
disciplinary panel? Demanding unanimity and constraining diverse authors to
one perspective would be detrimental to the guidance’s primary goal, which is to
encourage them to describe the variety of uncertainties appropriately. A normative
vocabulary meaningful only for one philosophical position is likely not to be used
by everybody.3 The challenge is to disentangle the various dimensions. This brings
us to the question: taking the different dimensions into account, how has the IPCC
developed its treatment of uncertainties over time?
3 History of treating uncertainties by the IPCC
3.1 IPCC typologies
Tables 2 and 3 present the simple typologies distinguished in the TAR (Moss and
Schneider 2000) and AR4 (see IPCC 2005) guidance notes. The first table lists basic
‘sources’ of uncertainty, in the way one would list the possible causes of failure
of a complicated machine. The machine here is called a model (scientific theories
can be viewed as models). Thus, the table supposes implicitly that there is a Truth
to be discovered, and uncertainty is the product of defective or limited means of
knowledge. While the first two sets of uncertainty sources in Table 2 can often
be quantified, the third “other” sources of uncertainty generally cannot. Table 3
demonstrates the evolution of a broader view on the issue of uncertainty, as it relates
to objective as well as subjective types of uncertainty, indicative examples of sources,
and typical approaches and considerations. The human dimensions of uncertainty get
a bigger role as a cause of unpredictability. Below, we discuss the development of the
treatment of uncertainties in the history of the IPCC in more detail.
3We argue that contrary to the objective/subjective difference, from a purely theoretical point of
view, the distinction between theories of risk (precise) and uncertainty (imprecise) is not philosoph-
ically irreducible. Truth and belief are fundamentally different concepts, but precise probabilities
can be seen as the limit case of imprecise probabilities, when the imprecision is zero. Probabilistic
reasoning is by far the best understood method consistent with the dominant precise approach
in science. But in reality, situations where precise probabilities are not well defined cannot be
avoided, e.g., in assessments of future developments the imprecision can never be reduced to zero.
Mathematical procedures to deal with imprecision are much less developed, in spite of a growing
body of empirical and theoretical literature on imprecise probabilities or fuzzy logic (Walley 1991).
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Table 2 Examples of sources of uncertainty in IPCC TAR uncertainty guidelines
Examples
Problems with data Missing components or errors in the data
“Noise” in the data associated with biased or incomplete
observations
Random sampling error and biases (non-representativeness)
in a sample
Problems with models Known processes but unknown functional relationships or errors
in the structure of the model
Known structure but unknown or erroneous values of some
important parameters
Known historical data and model structure, but reasons to believe
parameters or model structure will change over time
Uncertainty regarding the predictability (e.g., chaotic or stochastic
behavior) of the system or effect
Uncertainties introduced by approximation techniques used to
solve a set of equations that characterize the model
Other sources of uncertainty Ambiguously defined concepts and terminology
Inappropriate spatial/temporal units
Inappropriateness of/lack of confidence in underlying assumptions
Uncertainty due to projections of human behavior (e.g., future
consumption patterns, or technological change), which is distinct
from uncertainty due to “natural” sources (e.g., climate
sensitivity, chaos)
Source: Moss and Schneider (2000)
3.2 Evolution of uncertainty treatment in the IPCC assessments
In the IPCC First and Second Assessment Reports, uncertainty management and
treatment was not systematically addressed across WGs. At the stage of the First
Assessment Report (1990), the question whether climate change was a real problem
dominated the assessment, with a primary role for the climatologists of WG I. This
WG set the standard for the rigorous procedures that were later formalized for
all WGs. The political importance of the questions whether climate change was
occurring, and if so, whether human actions contributed to it, put pressure on the
authors to focus on the scientific uncertainties to provide a balanced answer. The
review procedures employed and the scope of participation in the production of
the WG I report ensured that sufficient attention was being paid to uncertainties.
In the IPCC First Assessment Report (1990), the WG I executive summary
started with what the authors were certain of and what they were confident about,
thus taking a subjective perspective. They used strong words like “predict”, a term
too strong for looking decades or more ahead. Uncertainty management was not
yet centrally guided, but was left at the discretion of the authors. For WG II
(Impacts) and WG III (Response Strategies),4 the review procedures were not yet
very rigorous, lacking systematic expert review procedures, while uncertainties were
4The responsibilities of WG II and WG III have changed since the First Assessment Report. WG II
now addresses impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, while WG III addresses mitigation.
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Table 3 The simple typology of uncertainties in IPCC AR4 guidelines
Type Indicative examples of sources Typical approaches
and considerations
Unpredictability Projections of human behavior Use of scenarios spanning a
not easily amenable to prediction plausible range, clearly stating
(e.g. evolution of political systems). assumptions, limits considered,
Chaotic components of complex and subjective judgments. Ranges
systems from ensembles of model runs
Structural Inadequate models, incomplete or Specify assumptions and system
uncertainty competing conceptual frameworks, definitions clearly, compare models
lack of agreement on model structure, with observations for a range
ambiguous system boundaries or of conditions, assess maturity
definitions, significant processes or of the underlying science and
relationships wrongly specified degree to which understanding
or not considered is based on fundamental concepts
tested in other areas
Value uncertainty Missing, inaccurate or non- Analysis of statistical properties
representative data, inappropriate of sets of values (observations,
spatial or temporal resolution, model ensemble results, etc);
poorly known or changing bootstrap and hierarchical
model parameters statistical tests; comparison of
models with observations
Source: IPCC Guidance Note (IPCC 2005)
not a major topic of debate. The Summary for Policymakers of WG II contains a
few sentences stressing several uncertainties, e.g. those related to the difficulty of
making regional estimates of climate-change impacts. In WG III, the formulation of
key findings did take uncertainties into account, albeit not in any consistent manner.
Two pages were used to describe the scenarios – as a description of uncertainty about
the future – used in the WG III report.
In the Second Assessment Report (1996), WG I dropped the usage of uncertainty
terms in its main policy messages, but added a special section on uncertainties.
While much attention was paid to reaching consensus about the appropriate for-
mulation of statements taking into account the uncertainties (“The balance of
evidence suggests. . . ,”5) no common language was used. “Predicting” was replaced
by “projecting” climatic changes on the basis of a set of scenarios.6 In its concluding
chapter on advancing the understanding, WG I mentions the need for a more formal
and consistent approach to uncertainties in the future. WG II, which during the
Second Assessment covered scientific-technical analyses of impacts, adaptations and
mitigation of climate change, assigned low, medium or high levels of confidence to
5In fact, this formulation was designed during the Plenary meeting jointly by IPCC delegates and
lead authors.
6A prediction or forecast is the result of an attempt to produce a most likely description or estimate
of the actual evolution of a variable in the future, e.g. at seasonal, interannual or long-term time
scales. Projections are based on simulations by models with various input assumptions, concerning,
e.g., future socio-economic and technological developments. They generally do not have likelihoods
attached to them.
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the major findings of the chapters in the executive summaries, like WG I in the First
Assessment Report taking a subjective approach. WG III covered the economic and
social dimensions of climate change. Managing and reporting uncertainties was not
a key focus in the WG III assessment, in which uncertainties were captured through
reporting of ranges from the literature and scenario-based what-if analyses of costs
of response action.
Box 1: Summary of steps recommended for assessing uncertainty in the TAR
1. For each of the major findings you expect to be developed in your chapter,
identify the most important factors and uncertainties that are likely to affect the
conclusions. Also specify which important factors/variables are being treated
exogenously or fixed, as it will almost always be the case that some important
components will be treated in this way when addressing the complex phenomena
examined in the TAR.
2. Document ranges and distributions in the literature, including sources of informa-
tion on the key causes of uncertainty. Note that it is important to consider the
types of evidence available to support a finding (e.g., distinguish findings that are
well established through observations and tested theory from those that are not
so established).
3. Given the nature of the uncertainties and state of science, make an initial
determination of the appropriate level of precision – is the state of science such
that only qualitative estimates are possible, or is quantification possible, and if
so, to how many significant digits? As the assessment proceeds, recalibrate level
of precision in response to your assessment of new information.
4. Quantitatively or qualitatively characterise the distribution of values that a para-
meter, variable, or outcome may take. First identify the end points of the range
that the writing team establishes, and/or any high consequence, low probability
outcomes or “outliers.” Particular care needs to be taken to specify what portion
of the range is included in the estimate (e.g., this is a 90% confidence interval)
and what the range is based on. Then provide an assessment of the general
shape (e.g., uniform, bell, bimodal, skewed, symmetric) of the distribution.
Finally, provide your assessment of the central tendency of the distribution
(if appropriate).
5. Using the terms described below, rate and describe the state of scientific informa-
tion on which the conclusions and/or estimates (i.e. from step 4) are based.
6. Prepare a “traceable account” of how the estimates were constructed that
describes the writing team’s reasons for adopting a particular probability dis-
tribution, including important lines of evidence used, standards of evidence
applied, approaches to combining/reconciling multiple lines of evidence, explicit
explanations of methods for aggregation, and critical uncertainties.
7. OPTIONAL: Use formal probabilistic frameworks for assessing expert judgment
(i.e. decision-analytic techniques), as appropriate for each writing team.
Source: Moss and Schneider (2000)
In preparation for the TAR, a strong demand for a more systematic approach to
uncertainties was identified – as recommended by WG I in the Second Assessment
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Report, and the subsequent discussion led to a so-called cross-cutting “Guidance Pa-
per” (Moss and Schneider 2000). The paper summarized the most relevant literature,
explored experiences in the Second Assessment Report, and proposed a stepwise
methodology (see Box 1). It also suggested options for usage of quantitative terms
for confidence levels, continuing the subjective perspective of the earlier assessments
and qualitative terms to describe the level of understanding based on both the
amount of evidence available and the degree of consensus among experts in the
TAR. While both types of terminologies again suggest a subjective perspective, the
latter could be considered more imprecise than the former. A difference between
disciplines or WGs was not made, implicitly suggesting a common approach for all
WGs, issues and disciplines.
The discussion in the author teams focused mainly on the choice of the most ap-
propriate terminology for the summaries rather than on a consistent application of all
seven steps of Box 1 throughout the assessment. WG II largely adopted the proposed
levels of confidence. WG I authors amended the guidance by adding a “virtually
certain” category and developing a different terminology for describing quantified
levels of likelihood. Their definition of likelihoods refers to “judgmental estimates
of confidence”, which seems to refer to Bayesian probabilities, even though many of
the lead authors used the scale as a hybrid of objective and subjective probability.
For example, after having determined an ‘objective’ (that is, solely observation- and
model-based estimate of the likelihood of a significant anthropogenic climate signal)
likelihood of “more than 90% chance” (“very likely”), a ‘subjective’ evaluation of
the quality of the estimate (and thus of the underlying climate models) led the lead
authors to lower their likelihood estimate to “more than 66% chance” (“likely”).
These considerations by the lead authors have not been made explicit however,
and have only come to light after careful study of the TAR WG I production
process (Petersen 2006). WG III authors were encouraged to use the guidance,
but – with a few exceptions – ignored it, feeling that the proposed approach did not
address their perspectives on uncertainty. Also in WG III, the attention of the Lead
Authors focused most on the terms (step 5), but eventually the proposed options
were judged to be less appropriate for the social scientists of WG III. However, even
without explicitly referring to the Guidance Note, other elements of the suggested
approach were applied, albeit not systematically, across all WG III chapters (notably
steps 1–4).
While this paper was written during the review phase, it is published after the
finalization of the AR4. Therefore in this paper we focus on the first three IPCC
major assessment reports rather than the 4th. However, it is useful to note that
eventually the AR4 dealt with uncertainties very much like the TAR did, with the
exception of WGIII, where for the first time a common, qualitative methodology
was adopted.
One may wonder why the authors, who were generally sympathetic to the guid-
ance, still focused mainly on the terminology. One important reason is practical: the
lack of time and the pressing existence of other competing priorities – IPCC authors
are “volunteers” who have a full set of non-IPCC professional obligations – and the
simplicity of using just a scale in a table rather than diving deeper into the much richer
guidelines. Another reason may be that scratching only the surface of the complex
uncertainty domain by focusing on a relatively easily managed part of it, allows the
assessors to continue with only a minimal change in their usual working methods.
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Also, intentionally or unintentionally, more political considerations may have played
a role. A more thorough reflection on the scientific methods and framing of problems
could be seen as a threat to the status of these methods and framings and to the
existing culture in the associated disciplines (Craye 2006, personal communication).
The fact that the authors focused on the terms has to be seen in the light of the
finding that readers of the report interpret the words very differently. The fact that
the TAR defined the meaning of words used to describe probabilities did not appear
to influence how people then interpreted those words (Patt and Schrag 2003; Patt
and Dessai 2005; Patt et al. 2004). More precisely, these authors found that among
a sample of COP 9 participants, the numerical interpretation of “unlikely, perhaps
very unlikely” climate change did not depend on whether they had read the IPCC
TAR. This suggests that the IPCC WG I likelihood scale is more a means to ensure
consistency among authors than a means to alleviate the known cognitive bias with
probabilistic information among readers.
3.3 Differences between working groups in the TAR
We return to our basic questions: are the differences between the three WGs real,
and if so what might be the reasons that a fully consistent treatment of uncertainties
across the three groups – and hence across disciplines – may be infeasible or
undesirable? In order to evaluate the way uncertainties were reported in the TAR,
we have focused on five key issues for each WG.
For WG I, we looked at observed temperature changes, observed concentrations
and radiative forcing, attribution to anthropogenic causes, future average climate
changes, and future changes in climate extremes. Most of these issues are dominated
by uncertainties in the physical sciences related to observations in the natural
world. These are often determined by uncertainties related to natural variability of
observed variables and lack of understanding about physical and chemical processes.
Much information is available, e.g. from world-wide observations of atmospheric,
terrestrial and marine variables over long periods. With respect to past and present
information, the IPCC deals with what could be regarded as relatively precise
and objective information which could be conducive to a frequentist attitude. As
Manning (2003) notes, notably the physical scientists prefer to consider uncertainty
in objective terms, in relationship to measurements, repeatability of results, and
with bounds for systematic errors. However, lack of consistency between different
available data sets, high data variability within data sets and the fact that many data
from observations are in fact based on data re-analysis using models may explain why
WG I eventually adopted a subjective perspective, although the subjective character
of the terminology – a (precise) likelihood scale capturing degrees of certainty – is
only revealed in the definitions (“judgmental estimates of confidence”) hidden in a
footnote. In the WG I TAR ranges for outcomes were usually given and explained.
However, the more explicitly subjective “confidence levels” which are used by WG
II, could lead readers to erroneously interpret the difference between WGs I and II
as one between objective and subjective findings, rather than one between precise
and imprecise information (see further below).
In general, WG I opted for the quantitative likelihood terminology (cf. Table 4
for the revised AR4 version) for all the five issues considered. One may question
this one-size-fits-all approach, since some issues are characterized by much more
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Table 4 Likelihood scale
Source: IPCC (2007a)
Likelihood terminology Likelihood of the occurrence/outcome
Virtually certain >99% probability
Extremely likely >95% probability
Very likely >90% probability
Likely >66% probability
More likely than not >50% probability
About as likely as not 33 to 66% probability
Unlikely <33% probability
Very unlikely <10% probability
Extremely unlikely <5% probability
Exceptionally unlikely <1% probability
imprecise and subjective information than others. This is the case when the reliability
of models or future developments are discussed. In attributing climate-change to
anthropogenic causes, for instance, both observations and models were used, which
led to inclusion of subjective judgments about the (imprecise) quality of the models
to give a (precise) frequency distribution of the outcomes, as was discussed above.
For future scenarios, the likelihood scales suggest a level of knowledge about the
future that does not exist. Furthermore, in speaking about the future, the condition-
ality of future developments (e.g. climatic changes) on future human choices needs
to be acknowledged.
For WG II, we looked at observed climate change impacts, projected impacts of
extremes, projected economic impacts, projected impacts on sectors and projected
impacts in regions. In WG II the biological sciences are more important than in WG I
and social sciences come in when vulnerability, impacts and adaptation are assessed.
The interactions in biological systems and between these systems and physical-
chemical and social systems, are more complex, are dependent on human choices and
actions, and are more subject to the different perspectives of the assessors. Unlike
most WG I data, most WG II data have relatively short time series of observations,
lack global coverage, and lack a set of globally agreed definitions and measurements
techniques. Changes in various systems (e.g. ecosystems) may be observed, but a
large number of assumptions are required to relate these observations to climate
change. The imprecise nature of the available information explains why it is more
difficult to agree on likelihoods of findings in a group of diverse authors in a WG
Table 5 Quantitatively calibrated levels of confidence
Confidence terminology Degree of confidence in being correct
Very high confidence At least 9 out of 10 chance
High confidence About 8 out of 10 chance
Medium confidence About 5 out of 10 chance
Low confidence About 2 out of 10 chance
Very low confidence Less than 1 out of 10 chance
Source: IPCC (2007b)
‘Low confidence’ and ‘very low confidence’ are only used for areas of major concern and where a
risk-based perspective is justified
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II chapter team. Being more explicit about the reliance on imprecise information
and subjective confidence levels (Table 5) therefore seems an appropriate way for
WG II to address the higher complexity and subjectivity of its findings, avoiding the
impression of objective and precise knowledge.
There are just a few occasions in the TAR where WG II appears to be inconsistent.
One example is the confusing usage of likelihood levels with respect to the projected
changes during the twenty-first century in extreme climate phenomena. This is
derived from the usage of these terms by WG I that is questioned above, and
is unavoidable since one IPCC WG cannot change the uncertainty assessment of
another WG. In only a few instances qualitative levels of understanding are used
(cf. Table 6 for the revised AR4 version).
The terminologies in both WG I and II are based on a subjective perspective. The
difference can be explained by the availability of more precise information in WG I
as compared to the more imprecise information available to WG II. The objective,
frequentist history in the dominant WG I disciplines (Manning 2003) may also be
an explanatory factor for the only implicit subjectivity in the definitions by WG I,
as compared to the explicitly subjective confidence levels of WG II. This may be
legitimate, but from an uncertainty communication point of view there is a risk –
maybe not to scientific analysts, but certainly to a policy audience – that “likelihoods”
could unintentionally be interpreted as more objective than “confidence levels” and
hence be awarded a higher level of “truth”, while it is only the consensus judgment of
the authors for the section in which the conclusion appears (a subset of the full lead
author teams and an even smaller subset of the 2,500 scientists contributing to the
assessments as lead or contributing authors or as reviewers).7 That such a risk is real,
may be illustrated by Patt (2008), who finds that readers may respond differently to
information about confidence levels if these are framed according to (dis-)agreement
between the IPCC experts or according to the outcomes of computer models.
For WG III, we looked at GHG emissions, GHG mitigation potential, short-
term costs and benefits, long-term costs and benefits (stabilization of GHG concen-
trations), and spill-over effects. In WG III the scale further tips to include social,
institutional, cultural and political issues characterized by different perspectives
and human choices and thus into subjective, imprecise, and volition territory. The
information basis is weaker than in the other WGs, since these variables are usually
not covered by long-term statistical time series. WG III did not use the various
options for the terminology in the TAR (with one exception – see discussion further
below) (Table 6). The authors opted for addressing uncertainty differently, mainly
through presentation of ranges of outcomes and explanation of the underlying
assumptions. In the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), the authors
explicitly have not attached any probabilities to emissions scenarios.8
7The author’s judgment is subjected to review and may therefore become considered representative
for a larger group of experts. However, it is crucial to ensure a spectrum of views within the lead-
authors team charged with crafting uncertainty statements.
8Pittock et al. (2001) and Schneider (2001, 2002) have suggested to attach probabilities to scenarios of
climate change to serve policy makers, but Gruebler and Nakicenovic (2001) have provided counter
arguments. The debate continues. It reflects, to some extent, the tension of the causal-intentional
dimension; the SRES authors prefer to keep the human choice dimension explicit, while other prefer
to take a subjective risk approach. See also Box 3.
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Table 6 Qualitatively calibrated levels of confidence
Amount of evidence (number and quality of independent sources) 
High agreement, 
limited evidence 
High agreement, 
medium evidence 
High agreement, 
much evidence 
Medium agreement, 
limited evidence 
Medium agreement, 
medium evidence 
Medium agreement, 
much evidence 
Low agreement, 
limited evidence 
Low agreement, 
medium evidence 
Low agreement, 
much evidence 
Level of
agreement
(on a 
particular
finding) 
Note: This table is based on two dimensions of uncertainty: the amount of evidence and the level
of agreement. The amount of evidence available about a given technology is assessed by examining
the number and quality of independent sources of information. The level of agreement expresses the
subjective probability of the results being in a certain realm.
Source: IPCC (2007c)
When addressing costs and benefits of particular levels of mitigation policies (e.g.
implementing the Kyoto Protocol or reaching particular levels of GHG stabilization),
the authors have reported a range of outcomes from the literature and clarified the
differences (steps 1–4 in Box 1) rather than attempting to arrive at a best (or most
likely) guess or assign confidence levels. An interesting exception is that in their
assessment of potentials of technological options in various economic sectors, the
authors of the chapter on the technological and economic potential of greenhouse
gas emission reduction options did attempt to make a best guess and estimated
probabilities of these potentials being achieved. However, this “best guess” suffered
from the weakness that for different options and for different sectors the potential
for mitigation was not assessed against the same baseline development, leading to
unquantified inconsistencies. The term “potential” was related to a poorly defined
new term “socio-economic potential”. The probability levels for potentials here
suggest an implicit systematic and comprehensive assessment of the probability of the
achievement of the potential of options and thus of factors such as the development
and implementation of policies as well as on “autonomous” societal developments.
Such an assessment was not done in the TAR.
A word count of the three WG TAR reports confirmed the differences between
the three groups (for details see http://www.centre-cired.fr/forum/article428.html).
For example, “uncertain” was found about twice as often in WG I as in WG II and
about three times as often as in WG III. “Proba” was found in WG II almost three
times as often as in WG I and four times as often as in WG III, and similarly “risk”
was used more than four times as often by WG II than by WG III, while it was hardly
used by WG I. In contrast, “choice” was found almost three times as often in WG III
as in WG II, and “decision”, a word hardly found in WG I, was found twice as often
in WG III as in WG II. According to this simple word count, uncertainty dominates
WG I; risk, WG II; and choice, WG III.
In summary, it may be more difficult for the readers to understand and interpret
the different approaches to uncertainty communication by different WGs, but there
are legitimate reasons why these differences exist. Similarly, Risbey and Kandlikar
(2007) argue that different quantities dealt with in IPCC assessments are known
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with different degrees of precision, and that hence a one size-fits all approach is not
appropriate. The different types of information (observations, model calculations,
scenarios, and volition) and the different levels of evidence and agreement make the
application of different approaches not only legitimate, but desirable.
3.4 Comprehensiveness of assessing uncertainties by the IPCC
Comprehensively addressing uncertainties across all dimensions is unrealistically
time-consuming (see also Section 2). A systematic analysis taking into account the
various elements of Table 1 has not been made, not even for a selected number of
key messages. It is not surprising that the uncertainty handling of the IPCC reports is
concentrated in the formulation of key messages in the Summaries for Policy Makers
(SPMs). The other elements have not been ignored and are often discussed during
the assessment of the available literature. For the authors of WGs I and II, who
generally use consistent terms within their group, this implies that the readers of
the assessment may end up being well informed about the levels of confidence or
likelihood of key statements in the summaries, but generally are not informed about
the basis for the uncertainty quantification. This approach has the advantage of using
consistent terminology, but disadvantages in that the terminology is not transparent,
that – notwithstanding the definition provided – the words means different things to
different people, and that readers are less informed about the basis of the reported
(high or low) likelihood or confidence level (uncertainties in the basic data, in model
simulations, in the influence of human choices?).
In the WG III TAR the emphasis has been on explaining the determinants of
outcomes, rather than quantifying likelihoods or confidence levels. For example,
how are technological potentials and their costs defined and calculated, and how do
different definitions and methods affect the outcomes? This has the disadvantage of
the absence of a common terminology, but the advantage of helping the readers to
understand the background of the results of the assessment. This analysis however
has not been done in the systematic and comprehensive way of the Kloprogge et al.
(2005) example.
SPMs are the parts of IPCC reports that are most carefully scrutinized by gov-
ernments and most widely read. The political sensitivity of the statements in SPMs
requires that their uncertainty be carefully described. Especially in WG III, with
social scientists from all regions and very different schools of thought, agreement
about controversial issues such as costs of response measures is a tough job. For
this reason, much attention has been focused on the way IPCC authors describe
uncertainty in the SPMs. However, this is only one of many things that needs to be
done to develop a high-quality assessment that is approved by the over 100 countries
that typically attend an IPCC Plenary.
3.5 The 4th IPCC assessment: update of uncertainty guidance
In preparation for the AR4, an Uncertainty Guidance Note was prepared
(IPCC 2005), to a large extent based on discussions during an IPCC workshop
(Manning and Petit 2004; Manning et al. 2004) and discussions between Lead
Authors of all WGs during and after their first meetings in the second half of
2004. Agreement was reached on this Guidance Note, and its application was tested
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in preparing preliminary drafts of the AR4 report. One innovative aspect of this
Guidance Note is the introduction of a hierarchy in the application of preferred
approaches, dependent on the amount and character of the available information and
the level of agreement between the assessors (see Box 2). The notion of a hierarchy
was also argued for by Kandlikar et al. (2005) the development of which paper cross-
fertilized the development of the AR4 Guidance Note.
Box 2 : Hierarchy of uncertainty approaches as a function of availability and
character of information and level of agreement
A. Direction of change is ambiguous or the issue assessed is not amenable to
prediction: Describe the governing factors, key indicators, and relationships. If a
trend could be either positive or negative, explain the pre-conditions or evidence
for each.
B. An expected trend or direction can be identified (increase, decrease, no significant
change): Explain the basis for this and the extent to which opposite changes
would not be expected. Include changes that have a reasonable likelihood even
where they are not certain. If you describe a collective level of confidence in
words, use the language options in Tables 4 or 5.
C. An order of magnitude can be given for the degree of change (i.e. sign and
magnitude to within a factor of 10): Explain the basis for estimates given and
indicate assumptions made. The order of magnitude should not change for
reasonable ranges in such assumptions. If you describe a collective level of
confidence in words, use the language options in Tables 4 or 5.
D. A range can be given for the change in a variable as upper and lower bounds, or
as the 5th and 95th percentiles, based on objective analysis or expert judgment:
Explain the basis for the range given, noting factors that determine the outer
bounds. If you cannot be confident in the range, use a less precise approach.
If you describe a collective level of confidence or likelihood of an outcome in
words, use the language options in Tables 5 or 6.
E. A likelihood or probability of occurrence can be determined for an event or for
representative outcomes, e.g. based on multiple observations, model ensemble
runs, or expert judgment: State any assumptions made and estimate the role
of structural uncertainties. Describe likelihoods using the calibrated language
given in Table 6 or present them quantitatively.
F. A probability distribution can be determined for changes in a continuous variable
either objectively or through use of a formal quantitative survey of expert views:
Present the PDF graphically and/or provide the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the distribution. Explain the methodology used to produce the PDF, any
assumptions made, and estimate the role of structural uncertainties.
Source: IPCC (2005)
The quantitative likelihood scales, confidence levels, and qualitative levels of
understanding of the TAR were updated for the AR4 (Tables 4, 5 and 6). As dis-
cussed above, the different types of terminologies could be considered to fall in
different domains and hence the terminology of Tables 4, 5 and 6 could at least the-
oretically be considered complementary, e.g. one can have high confidence (Table 5)
in a low likelihood (Table 4) and simultaneously provide more information about the
arguments for the assignment of the confidence and/or likelihood levels (Table 6).
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One could consider the confidence terminology as a second order probability when
it is combined with the likelihood terminology. However, likelihood levels implicitly
include confidence levels, for example a high likelihood is hard to combine with low
confidence. Therefore, combinations of likelihoods and confidence levels are difficult
to interpret (Risbey and Kandlikar 2007). Because of this problem, and not to
confuse the reader, IPCC (2005) therefore recommends to avoiding the use of more
than one terminology for one issue, a recommendation not followed consistently by
WGII in the AR4. We would argue that the use of the qualitative scale proposed
by IPCC and much more attention to explaining the basis of key findings provide
complementary information in a form that is less likely to confuse readers.
Table 6 provides additional insights as compared to Tables 4 and 5. Since only
few socio-economic issues are suitable for the usage of quantitative uncertainty
terminology, Table 6 is particularly relevant for WG III, and can be expanded by
authors to arrive at more differentiation than the TAR 2 × 2 matrix with qualitative
terminology that was proposed by Moss and Schneider (2000).9 Experience during
the TAR demonstrated that different interpretation of the qualitative terms (specu-
lative, established but incomplete, well established, competing explanations) can lead
to confusion or incorrect communication. Therefore the terms have been replaced
by terminologies capturing both dimensions of the matrix. The fact that the new
Guidance allows for a more diverse approach addresses some of the problems that
we have identified in the previous section. We note, however, that the Guidance does
not specifically distinguish between the different dimensions, notably the distinction
between natural system uncertainty and human choices.
4 Spotlight on: costs and potentials
To evaluate the application of the Guidance in WG III, we focus on the issue of
costs and potentials in more detail, since one of the policy-relevant questions likely
to be of most interest to readers of WG III’s contribution to AR4 is: What are the
costs of and potential for GHG mitigation in the short to medium term in different
economic sectors (e.g., to 2030)? The answer to this question depends on a very
large number of assumptions and hence is highly uncertain. Communicating that
uncertainty to policymakers and other readers is a major challenge. We look first
at the sources of uncertainty in the answers to questions, then at the challenges for
communicating those uncertainties. Sources of uncertainty about costs include the
need for a baseline, the vagueness of the concept, structural systemic change in the
long term, and human choices.
1. The first source of uncertainty is in the assumed reference scenario, i.e. the
description of the world of 2030, which includes assumptions on system behav-
iour and human choice. For determining costs and potentials in 2030 in the AR4,
WG III has initially chosen to look at two scenarios for 2030, SRES A1 and B2
(Price et al. 2006). The A1 scenario is for a world of “. . . very rapid economic
9Interestingly, it has been suggested that the matrix not only can be used as qualifiers for key
statements, but also can be filled with response options organized according to the level of consensus
and evidence.
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growth, low population growth, and the rapid introduction of new and more
efficient technologies.” The B2 world is one “in which the emphasis is on local
solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability. It is a world with
moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic development, and
less rapid and more diverse technological change than in. . . A1. . . ” (Nakicenovic
et al. 2005).
A1 and B2 are both baseline scenarios, i.e., they contain no overt efforts to
control GHG emissions. As such, they are counter-factual descriptions of the world.
However, the scenarios are still useful because they provide baselines against
which the potential for new technology can be tested, independent of whether it is
adopted voluntarily or to meet a legally binding target. Probabilities are not assigned
(see Box 3).
2. The definition of the terms “potential” and “costs” introduces a second source
of uncertainty. Several different measures of potential exist. At the high end,
technical potential estimates the performance of the technology, independent
of cost considerations. At the low end, market potential estimates the extent to
which the technology is likely to be used, given its cost, competitive technology,
government regulation, consumer preferences and all of the other factors that
affect the market. These two measures of potential will give very different esti-
mates. For estimating mitigation potential and cost, WG III used an intermediate
measure: economic potential, which is defined as the cost of GHG mitigation
when non-market social costs and benefits are added to market costs and
benefits, and when social discount rates (about 5% in the short to medium term)
are used instead of private discount rates (typically 15% or higher). If sufficient
information is available, this approach can provide a mitigation supply curve,
i.e., the amount of GHG mitigation that could be achieved in 2030 as a function
of the cost expressed in $/tCO2. Also, the definition of “costs” introduces uncer-
tainties, e.g. with respect to the boundaries of what is included in the cost calcu-
lation, e.g. the inclusion or exclusion of transaction costs or distributional effects.
A top-down approach will generate reasonable estimates, provided that the
problems in estimating long-term elasticities are addressed, and that there are no
“paradigm-changing” technological changes. For example, if there were a break-
through in hydrogen fuel cell technology that made this approach attractive for both
vehicle and stationary source use, large amounts of hydrogen would be required,
and large amounts of CO2 suitable for carbon capture and storage (CCS) would be
generated. CCS technology could be implemented much more rapidly than generally
assumed, and global CO2 emissions reduced more cheaply than currently anticipated.
Surprises can also happen in the other direction. A breakdown of political will to
control GHGs could lead to fewer incentives to apply existing technology on a
large scale or to develop new technology. Either would raise the costs of controlling
greenhouse gas emissions.
3. Projections of cost create a third set of uncertainties. While all of the technology
that WG III will be considering has been invented, some of it (e.g. the hydrogen
fuel cell) is in the early phases of the development cycle, and could see large
changes from projected costs over the next 25 years. Technologies that prove
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cheaper than currently estimated will take larger shares of the market; technolo-
gies that prove more expensive are unlikely to be implemented.
4. The fourth set of uncertainties involves the way in which technological improve-
ment will be implemented, again involving assumptions about human choices.
Improved energy efficiency, which is a major component of GHG mitigation
technology, can be used to reduce fossil-fuel consumption, and thus CO2 emis-
sions, or it can be used to improve output in some fashion. Vehicle efficiency in
the USA is a classic example of this choice. The actual efficiency of automotive
engines in the USA has improved steadily (AuYeung et al. 2001). However, this
improvement has not translated into reduced fuel usage, but into greater vehicle
size, power, or luxury.
Box 3: IPCC scenarios and uncertainties
IPCC recommends using a set of six “illustrative SRES scenarios” to cover the
range of future GHG emission levels in evaluations of future, climate change and
its impacts, and mitigation and adaptation options. Many observers believe that
some of these illustrative scenarios are less likely than others, particularly the two
that provide the highest and lowest emissions in 2100. This had led to suggestions
that probabilities be assigned to six scenarios as a way of reducing uncertainty (e.g.
Schneider 2002). We do not agree for two reasons. First, from a methodological
standpoint, scenarios are images of the future. They are not predictions or forecasts
(Nakicenovic et al. 2005). Assigning probabilities to scenarios turns them into
forecasts, which requires a set of judgments that the team that developed the SRES
scenarios was not asked to make. Second, all of the SRES scenarios are unrealistic
because they, by design, do not take into account the efforts being made around
the world to reduce GHG emissions. These efforts can only grow with the passage
of time, making the SRES scenarios even less realistic. The scope of these efforts
and their success in reducing emissions is highly uncertain. Risbey (2004) notes that
the SRES scenarios combine a low level of information (about the future) with
partial agency (the future can be changed to some extent by human choice) and that
therefore risk assessment using probabilities is particularly hazardous. Assigning
probabilities to the SRES scenarios does nothing to reduce the uncertainty around
the effectiveness of mitigation efforts or the uncertainty around future emission
levels. However, assigning probabilities could provide a greater aura of certainty to
these highly uncertain projections. Among others, Reilly et al. (2001) have criticized
the IPCC for not providing a probability estimate of anthropogenic warming in the
twenty-first century. In response, Allen et al. (2001) note three reasons: the difficulty
of assigning probabilities to socio-economic trends (see above), the difficulty of
obtaining consensus ranges for qualities like climate sensitivity, and the possibility
of a non-linear response in the carbon cycle or ocean circulation to very high, late
twenty-first century greenhouse gas concentrations. For future scenario exercises,
assigning different subjective, imprecise levels of plausibility to different scenarios
could be explored. This would be preferable to assigning quantified probabilities,
which may suggest to readers that objective and precise information about the future
is available. This would be in addition to explicitly recognizing the role of human
choice in shaping the future.
Given all of these uncertainties, in the AR4 WG III has not assigned either
probabilities or confidence levels to its estimates of mitigation cost or potential.
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However, the two-dimensional qualitative terminology, combining information on
the amount of evidence in the literature and the agreement between the authors, has
indeed been used for most of the key findings in the area of costs and potentials,
after continuous encouragement of the authors by the IPCC leadership. However,
this alone is insufficient to adequately communicate the uncertainties. The challenge
for WG III was to explain to policymakers and other readers the process used to
develop its estimates, and the uncertainties involved, in sufficient detail to allow them
to judge the validity of the numbers. In the AR4 discussion in WG III on costs and
potentials, guidelines were formulated for reporting. These include the reporting
of discount rates; the year and region for which the costs are estimated; the type,
definition and level of the costs; the reference case; the preferred units; and the type
of potential. This description was meant to allow readers to judge the meaning of
the results being presented and to determine when it is possible to sum sectoral or
regional information into global totals. This was one of the most challenging tasks
in WGIII’s assessment, and a completely satisfactory result was not achieved, e.g.
because full consistency between baseline scenarios could not be achieved. However,
global and regional totals were derived for all sectors except transportation, where
the inclusion of international aviation made regional totals impossible. A description
of the assumptions underlying the results was provided for each sector.
5 Discussion and recommendations: handling uncertainties in future
IPCC assessments
5.1 A broader approach rather than a scale
It is tempting to organize guidelines on uncertainty around a general scale going
from totally certain (or totally true) to totally unknowable. Unfortunately a strict
hierarchical classification is hard to find in the domain of risks and uncertainty. The
most important insight arising from an interdisciplinary assessment on uncertainty is
its conceptual diversity.
There have been attempts at systematic taxonomies of uncertainty (see, e.g.
Smithson 1989; Walker et al. 2003; Janssen et al. 2005; Petersen 2006, see also
Section 2). However, although a uniform taxonomic approach is a very systematic
way to explore concepts, it may not be the most appropriate approach within the
context of guidelines for hundreds of authors. As discussed above, using a multi-
dimensional typology of uncertainty is quite complex, and may result in a voca-
bulary that is precise in a technical context but ineffective at communication.
Also, while the above discussion of the objective/subjective, the precise/imprecise,
the causal/intentionality dimensions of uncertainty is key for demonstrating the
importance of diversity in uncertainty treatment, it is not necessarily the best way
to structure the uncertainty communication framework. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss all elements of uncertainty communication in the context of climate
change.10
10E.g. we did not discuss important issues such as communicating relative importance of uncer-
tainties, the possibilities of addressing robustness rather than the uncertainty of findings, and the
importance of graphical representation of uncertainties for communication with users.
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Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) have proposed a rich framework to address different
aspects of uncertainty. In this framework, called NUSAP, a quantitative analysis of
the available data (the Numerical, Unit, and Spread steps) is followed by a more
qualitative analysis (the Assessment and Pedigree steps). This approach can in theory
be considered to be quite useful for the IPCC. This approach would eventually aim to
qualify the reports’ findings, which are mostly statements about the future of complex
dynamic systems involving the human will, in a multidimensional fashion with a few
relevant descriptors to help the reader assess which degree of confidence he or she
wants to place in the findings. The approach has been successfully explored in recent
years (van der Sluijs et al. 2005; see also http://www.nusap.net/). However, since it
requires a large amount of effort to implement and report the approach properly,
the reality of the IPCC process, with many competing claims for time and resources,
makes its full application there unrealistic.
However, it is worth exploring whether some elements of the approach could
be adopted to broaden the current IPCC practice. One option would be to en-
hance reporting of pedigree. In this context, “pedigree” refers to the ancestry of
information in a broad manner: it is taken to mean an evaluative description of
the mode of production of the information. It rates aspects of the information
such as the way indicators have been defined, how data were collected, analyzed
and reviewed, and the institutional culture involved (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990).
Table 6 (which shows qualitatively calibrated levels of confidence along two pedigree
dimensions – “amount of evidence (theory, observations, models)” and “level of
agreement or consensus”) constitutes a simple example of the pedigree approach.
In the pedigree approach, more dimensions can be taken into account, however, for
example by disaggregating the “amount of evidence” dimension again into “theory”,
“observations” and “models” (Moss and Schneider 2000; Petersen 2006). Even more
extensively, describing the building blocks of the uncertainties, like in the example of
the mitigation potentials again provides more information. Another example that has
not been covered by the IPCC explicitly yet would be the description of the history of
the estimates of the climate sensitivity: how did the IPCC translate (or not translate)
developments in the climate literature into changes of the reported ranges of values?
5.2 Organizing diversity in IPCC statements
Another way to broaden the approach to uncertainly handling and communication
is to accept and clarify diversity. In principle various ways of describing uncertain-
ties can be complementary. According to Manning et al. (2004), identifying and
explaining the determinants of uncertainty including issues as definitions of variables,
assumptions regarding system boundaries affecting the method used, and existence
of competing conceptual frameworks, is often more relevant than trying to quantify
those uncertainties. In all WGs, the uncertainty approach should be dependent on
the issue at stake: e.g., different questions may lead to different choices for the kind
of approach to be used.
Parker (2005) evaluated the IPCC experience with uncertainty management
focusing on how the evidential basis of findings could be evaluated, how the qual-
itative scale could be adjusted, and how the treatment of uncertainties could be
further coordinated and tailored. Coming to this issue from another angle, she also
concludes that diversity in uncertainty communications is required, and suggests that
Climatic Change (2009) 92:1–29 23
a tailor-made, chapter-specific approach could be developed for future assessments,
involving experts beyond the climate science community, e.g. philosophy of science
and risk assessment experts.
It is tempting to summarize the discussion above for organizing actual statements
about the various issues in the various WGs according to the dominant philosophy
regarding uncertainties and their level of precision (objective/frequentist versus
subjective and precise versus imprecise), the distinction between natural system
uncertainty and human choice, and the preferred approach regarding communication
of the uncertainties. We recognize that the uncertainty philosophy is in the eyes of
the beholder, but on the other hand we think that the discourse about particular
issues is generally dominated by one of the philosophies. And as we concluded in
Section 2, the objective/subjective distinction is fundamental. In Fig. 1 we make an
attempt to illustrate this by grouping types of statements for the various issues and
placing them in different, but overlapping areas for the three dimensions discussed
in this paper. In the figure, dimensions change from uncertainties in natural systems,
a frequentist perspective and precise information dominating in the left top corner to
intentionality in human systems, a subjective perspective, and imprecise information
dominating in the right bottom corner of the figure. None of the statements of any
of the Working Groups is completely objective/subjective or precise/imprecise or
even causal/intentional, but the different emphasis is reflected in the figure. Please
note that this figure is not prescribing which approach should be selected or in
which part of the panel a particular subject should be placed, because one issue can
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Fig. 1 Approximate relationship between the dominant uncertainty philosophy, precision of infor-
mation, statements about key IPCC issues, and uncertainty communication approaches
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be approached from different perspectives and hence different approaches can be
preferred by different people. Rather, it illustrates the dominant paradigms that we
have noted for the different issues and from that explains the different approaches
selected by different groups in the IPCC.
A specific challenge is to locate costs and potentials of mitigation options in
this figure and to determine an appropriate approach for these issues. If costs and
potentials could be precisely defined and statistically tracked, they could be regarded
as frequentist and put in the left top corner of the figure. But as discussed in the
previous section, in practice they are not, so we prefer to consider information
about these issues as subjective and imprecise and put them in the right bottom
corner. Although one can quarrel about details and exceptions, roughly one can
superimpose the hierarchical approach of the IPCC Guidance Note on the matrix
(grey shaded arrow), and thus conclude that generally, the hierarchy captures in
a stylized way the multi-dimensional nature of the uncertainty information, clearly
an improvement over earlier attempts. One could consider in the future if even
more explicit acknowledgements of the different dimensions would be desirable
and feasible.
5.3 Conclusions and recommendations
In this paper we have made an attempt to explain why IPCC Working Groups have
taken different approaches to uncertainty handling. What lessons can we draw from
the evaluation of the treatment of uncertainties in the TAR and the new insights
discussed above? We summarize the most important ones in Box 4. Although some
scientists in WG I may have a predominantly objective, frequentist perspective, in the
TAR both WG I and II eventually chose a subjective definition of uncertainty terms
following IPCC guidance documents. That they selected different terminologies we
relate to the availability of precise or imprecise information. WG III authors did
not use any consistent methodology until the AR4. We partly explain this by the
dominance in this WG of the human choice dimension, which is not explicitly covered
by the IPCC guidance. While these differences across WGs may be confusing to
readers, we argue that it is, in fact, both legitimate and appropriate. A one-size-fits-
all approach would obscure important differences in the type of uncertainties for the
users. The questions which are addressed by the three WGs differ, and hence also
the approach towards uncertainty should differ. The IPCC Uncertainty Guidance
Note for the AR4 proposes a simple, pragmatic and one-dimensional hierarchy in
addressing such differences: from explaining the determinants of uncertainty, to
using qualitative terms of understanding, to using quantitative confidence levels, to
quantitative likelihood scales, while at the same time carefully and comprehensively
explaining the underlying assumptions. We think the AR4 guidance provides impor-
tant additional direction compared to the TAR guidance. The guidance could be
developed further for future assessments, inter alia, by further elaborating the
diversity into more tailor-made approaches for different issues or Working Groups.
How can the uncertainty communication in future assessments be improved more
specifically? For simplicity we assume that IPCC would retain the same Working
Group structure, something that may or not be desirable (e.g., see Raes and Swart
2007). We suggest that for WG I in the next assessment it should be clear which
part of the findings are based on observations, which on models, and which on
Climatic Change (2009) 92:1–29 25
future scenarios that involve human choice. It should be noted that data are usually
“models of data” (Edwards 1999), thus blurring the categories of observations
and models. This recommendation also applies to the other WGs. The distinction
between observations, theory and models was also proposed in the original TAR
guidance, which suggested a plot with four axes, corresponding to the confidence in
(1) the theory, (2) the observations, (3) the models and (4) the consensus within a
field (Giles 2002). Since theories are usually based on observations and both feed
into models, they are not independent of the other categories. We do not suggest
theories as a separate category. Instead, we distinguish the human choice category
because of its relevance from a policy perspective.
Based on the above considerations we would favor a qualitative approach over
the quantitative likelihood scale for issues that involve complex modeling and/or
human choice. As Allen et al. (2001) note, while it may be more convenient for some
purposes if more of the uncertainties were summarized numerically by the IPCC, this
approach would no longer provide an accurate representation of current, scientific
knowledge. Even for topics for which relatively objective and precise information is
available, controversy is possible in the communication of uncertainty information.
Recently the so-called “hockey stick” graph was heavily criticized (McIntyre and
McKitrick 2003, 2005). This led to an in-depth discussion and renewed consideration
of the basic data, which however did not lead to conclusions fundamentally different
from those of the IPCC, e.g., NRC (2006). What can be learned from this experience
is that even more attention should be given to the selection of graphs (or tables)
and explaining why they have been selected, preferably always including different
sources of information in the same graph (or table).
In previous assessments we observe a tendency to focus on the middle of distribu-
tions of variables for formulating key conclusions (while providing an uncertainty
range) rather than explaining the conditions that underlie the extreme values of
the distribution. Particularly because of the policy relevance of such extreme values
(e.g. high impacts or high costs), for future assessments we recommend that outliers
are given more attention, even if the likelihood of occurrence is assessed to be small.
For WG II, we find the usage of a confidence scale appropriate for many issues, but
recommend the complementary usage of the two-dimensional qualitative scale, with
proper explanation of underlying assumptions, especially for issues which involve
model calculations and assumptions about human actions, and following a pedigree
approach for key findings. We suggest avoiding the use of the likelihood scale by WG
II, with the exception of quotations from WG I, noting the reason for the usage of
these terms. Statements that depend on human choices, e.g. in adaptation, have to be
clearly acknowledged.
Key questions in WG III deal with quantitative estimates of current and future
greenhouse emissions and their reduction potential, and costs of response options.
The approach and terminology used when addressing these issues depend on the kind
of question to be answered. If the question would be “what are the most likely costs
of implementing the Kyoto Protocol?” the answer would necessarily be conditional -
depending on a large number of assumptions regarding the design of policies and
measures, and demographic, economic and technological developments – but it could
theoretically be answered in a subjective fashion, e.g. by expert elicitation. A more
interesting question however may be “how do the costs of implementing the Kyoto
Protocol depend on the design of policies”? Or, “what are robust options to reach
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the Kyoto Protocol targets with minimal costs?” These questions require a different,
qualitative approach to uncertainties and an explicit recognition of the role of human
choice.
In WG III, the difference of views on costs of mitigation between “top-down”
economic modelers and “bottom-up” technological experts is a well-known example,
where different paradigms initially led to widely different results. As a result of an
intensive exchange of views and associated adaptation of methods, this initial gap
had been narrowed very substantially at the time of IPCC’s latest assessment report
(IPCC 2007c). Nevertheless, not only in the TAR but also in the AR4, explaining
these differences was one of the key elements of the SPM. The same applies to the
SRES scenarios, where different scenario families describe different views on how
the future may unfold, rather than attempt to describe a most likely future. New
ways of addressing scenario uncertainty are currently being explored, like imprecise
probabilities (Tonn 2005), possibility theory (Ha-Duong 2005) and utilizing belief
functions (Kriegler and Held 2005). The new approaches mentioned above have not
yet been included in the AR4, but it is likely that results can be included in scenario
development work that may feed into a future assessment report.
Also in WG III, describing and explaining outliers should get more attention. For
example, with usually wide ranges of estimates for costs of options proponents of
mitigation measure tend to use the lowest estimates and adversaries the highest.
Bringing out more clearly the conditions for these more extreme estimates puts
the results more in perspective. We have elaborated on the uncertainties related to
potentials and associated costs of options. Most important is to provide appropriate
explanations of the various sources of uncertainties, such as the baseline scenario
used, the definition and coverage of potential” and “costs”, and technological
improvements assumed.
Box 4: Recommendations for future assessment reports
– Make clear what parts of findings are based on observations, on models and on
future scenarios including human choice
– Carefully explain definitions of indicators and assumptions underlying outcomes,
including outliers
– For selected key indicators and findings, adopt a more extensive pedigree
approach.
– Avoid usage of probabilities for future scenarios without stressing subjectivity
– Use qualitative terminology for describing uncertainty related to costs and poten-
tials of response options
– Further develop uncertainty guidance to structure communication methods
according to diversity of uncertainty perspectives
– Develop a systematic way of communicating uncertainties related to human
choice and intentionality
– Develop a more rigorous and comprehensive process of analysing uncertainties
focussing on the key findings, e.g. applying (elements of) the NUSAP approach
We recommend that for future assessment reports, the current Guidance be
further developed to structure communication methods according to the various
uncertainty dimensions, explicitly including methods to deal with uncertainty related
to human choice. We suggest that all WGs adopt more thorough procedures for
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analyzing the “pedigree” of uncertainties affecting their most relevant key findings
and outcomes, carefully explaining the basis of differences in outcomes. This would
be similar to the “traceability account” that was already recommended by Moss and
Schneider (2000) for the TAR, but not implemented in either TAR or AR4. Use
of a limited pedigree approach would lead to a more diversified and informative
treatments of uncertainty in assessment reports. It would be quite informative to do
a pedigree analysis on selected AR4 findings after its publication. If such an effort
were successful, it would enhance the possibility of a formal application of a more
comprehensive uncertainty treatment for future IPCC and other assessments, in line
with recommendations already formulated for the TAR. In addition, it would be
useful to develop a practical guide for how to implement a pedigree approach, for
future IPCC or other assessments. Such a guide should be added to the general
Guidance.
This paper has focused on one important issue: diversity of methods. A diversified
communication of uncertainties with a concise pedigree description for key findings
would improve the quality of the assessments because it allows the readers not only
to understand how large the uncertainties are, and how confident the assessors are
about them, but also what their nature and origin is.
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